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For the philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, being-with is the primary 
ontological condition: 
Being cannot be anything but being-with-one-another, 
circulating in the with and as the with of this singular-
plural existence (Nancy 2000:3)
Being-with – being as singular-plural – questions the possibility 
of thinking the body or the subject in isolation. Despite its 
singularity, the being can only be thought through the being-
with. Being-with for Nancy implies no sense of similarity, 
or connection: rather it is an ontological state of opening out 
onto the world, of the production of time and space through 
this movement that Nancy sees as the spacing of the world. 
Moreover it is only through the being-with that we are capable 
of thinking about individuals and groups.
We can never simply be “the we”, understood as a 
unique subject, or understood as an indistinct “we” 
that is like a diffuse generality. “We” always expresses a 
plurality, expresses “our” being divided and entangled: 
“one” is not “with” in some general sort of way, but 
each time according to determined modes that are 
themselves multiple and simultaneous (people, culture, 
language, lineage, network, group, couple, band, and 
so on). What is presented in this way, each time, is a 
stage [scène] on which several [people] can say “I”, 
each on his own account, each in turn. But the “we is 
not the adding together or the juxtaposition of these 
“I”s. A “we”, even one that is not articulated, is the 
condition for the possibility of each I (Nancy 2000:65) 
Nancy, as a philosopher of the continental tradition, engages 
with phenomenology and ontology, and also with images 
and texts, through a critique of Heidegger, following on from 
deconstructionist thinkers such as Derrida. Nancy incorporates 
the aporias and indeterminacies of poststructuralism 
into a phenomenology that critiques the very ground of 
phenomenological thought.
Being-with occurs prior to space and time, prior to the 
individual. It operates as divisions and entanglements – 
intertwinings and dispersions. It is what makes space and time 
possible, and also the possibility of thinking about individuals 
and societies as hypostatisations of the primary being-with. The 
being-with, the “co-”, the “mit-”, is a spacing, an opening out of 
the world. Being-with can apply to one who is alone. Indeed, to 
be alone, for Nancy, is to be alone-with (Nancy 2005). The being-
with is a condition for the being-alone. The walk undertaken 
that July day can be considered in terms of the being–with, 
more of an illustration to help us understand what it means 
than an example of the being-with in practice . The walk 
encourages a way of thinking about the being-with and about the 
production of collective experience.
All the participants set off on their walk alone, at roughly 2 minute 
intervals. We aimed to keep within sight of each other, while 
allowing for the walk to be experienced as an individual journey. 
The individual/collective nature of the walk dictated a tacit sense 
that during the walk we should not speak to each other, despite 
that for most of the time we were in visual contact. Awareness of 
other group members, however, was unavoidable, and recognition 
of this from time to time took the form of a smile, a wave or a nod: 
Being-with: Inspired by a collective sensory walk signs of the mutual agreement not to speak. There was awareness 
of other bodies, not always conscious, and of the way in which 
this awareness placed limits on the movement of our own bodies. 
We could not go too fast or too slow, or we would meet up/
coincide with other members of the group. We had to keep up to 
a certain extent or we would keep everyone waiting in the café. 
The keeping in sight enabled a less than diligent studying of the 
map and directions. The walk, as a common performance, became 
a dance of proximity and distance, respect for and awareness of 
others’ sense of personal space. At times bodies congregated in 
certain spaces: the rose garden acted as a lure for affective bodies, 
its rose bushes offering small privacies. It offered colour and scent 
(this was a sensory walk, after all), and the banter of some young 
gardeners, providing verbal records for those of us who respond 
more strongly to the verbal than the non-verbal. Another area for 
congregation of sorts was the complex system of underpasses and 
bridges that seemed to connect two sections of the walk together 
– an urban intermediary in the experience of parkland that formed 
the beginning and the end of the walk. The underpasses, while 
familiar to some, were threatening to others, revelatory of the 
different micro and macropolitical histories inscribed in bodies that 
produced their sense of familiarity/unfamiliarity, ease/unease in 
the lived experience of these places. 
Despite these differences in the production of experience from 
a subjective point of view, the collective field of experience 
emerged as such because of the sharing of space and time, the 
sharing of encounters with other bodies and with the materialities 
of the space, and also through the institutional and interpersonal 
construction of the walk as a collective practice. This took place 
retrospectively as well as at the time through the conversations 
that followed, and the thinking through of the experience 
together. It also emerged from the institutional contexts that our 
bodies were all engaged with, a context that encourages certain 
types of thinking and engagement, certain approaches and forms 
of reflexivity and sensibility that hone and produce bodies and 
make possible such an event to take place. 
The collective walk is the being-with converted to an ethics of 
collaboration: a call and response, an acknowledgement and a 
knowledge of shared worldings. Bodies moving together and 
apart, aware of the necessary space between them but reassured 
by the others’ presences. Connected through the structure of the 
walk, but able to go off track to take a photo, write or explore 
a corner of a field. Some bodies were more involved in the 
choreographing of the walk – standing by a stile, directing people 
and stopping them from veering off, rounding up or waving us 
away from turning onto a busy road. Various different practices 
and modes of engagement were involved in the placemaking 
that we all participated in. Some bodies were more focused on 
particular aspects of the experience, for example on memories, or 
on history, or on things on the ground, since all of these bodies 
were of course imbricated within institutional rationalities and 
regimes that focus attention on the concerns of their research 
interests, which are both produced by and productive of those 
regimes. All of these practices were involved in the making of the 
walk as a whole. 
We all walked through parkland on a summer’s afternoon. 
We all breathed the warm, muggy air, travelled on foot, felt 
the grass underneath us, thought about our research. The field 
of experience was produced through these materialities, and 
through the tying of them together in the production of the 
walk. A walk links places and moreover produces places through 
its performance, in a similar way to how Heidegger describes 
the bridge as gathering streams and bank and land together 
(Heidegger 1993). The walk gathered together aspects of place, 
memory, bodies and thought: a field of experience could emerge 
from its performance. Bodies moving together-but apart, 
playing with proximity and distance: the nature of the collective 
experience produces the possibility for the collectivity of the 
experience to be recognised as such. Returning to the university, 
working through the resonances of memory, different histories 
create disjuncture, a sense of the absolute otherness of the other. 
The experience does not have to be felt as connection to others to 
be collective. 
This is where Jean-Luc Nancy is important. He posits a 
prepersonal sense of the collective which occurs before the 
subject. This then situates the collective as existential – as a 
condition of existence. In a recent lecture, Nancy discussed how 
our common condition of thinking is that the individual is first 
and everything else is second. Instead, he suggests that the “co” 
comes first. The being-with that is a condition of existence. This 
primary being-with, however, is not restricted to the human. 
In Nancy, it is without limits. While an ethics can emerge from 
this primary being-with, and indeed Nancy suggests that a 
new politics of community can emerge from this, an ethical 
sensibility is not implicit in this ontological formulation. Being-
with does not necessarily involve a sharing of something, 
a feeling of being connected. Being-with occurs before the 
personal, before the individual. The primary being-with enables 
something different from an ethics: it enables a sense of what 
Nancy considers as the spacing of the world – the primary 
spacing from which space, time and individualisations emerge. 
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